Execution Surplus and Welfare in a Simplified Intent-Auction Game
Solver competition and endogenous participation shape private execution gains and aggregate welfare across batch durations in a simplified intent-auction game.
Posts / 85 records
Posts
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A chronological index of field notes on research, engineering, markets, and protocols.
2026
12 recordsTVL, Marginal Price, and Liquidity in an AMM
TVL is a measure of capital. The marginal price is the current quote. Liquidity tells us how much trading it takes to move that quote.
When Multiple Pools Behave Like One: Impact-Constrained Capacity Concentration in Uniswap v3
When Multiple Pools Behave Like One: Impact-Constrained Capacity Concentration in Uniswap v3
Before the Result Could Count, the Benchmark Had to Freeze
Before the Result Could Count, the Benchmark Had to Freeze
A Large DEX Order Is a Sequential Control Problem
A Large DEX Order Is a Sequential Control Problem
When the Fee Switch Turns On, Does Liquidity Walk Away?
When the Fee Switch Turns On, Does Liquidity Walk Away?
After Uniswap v4 Went Live. The Pool Is No Longer the Whole Market.
After Uniswap v4 Went Live. The Pool Is No Longer the Whole Market.
When the Book Keeps Moving. What Hyperliquid Lets Outsiders Reconstruct.
When the Book Keeps Moving. What Hyperliquid Lets Outsiders Reconstruct.
Dynamic Fees in AMMs: When the Signal Matters
Dynamic Fees in AMMs: When the Signal Matters
Hyperliquid Shows What a Market Looks Like Without an AMM Pool
Hyperliquid Shows What a Market Looks Like Without an AMM Pool
Before MEV, I Built a Rust AMM Lab to Measure Pool State
Before MEV, I Built a Rust AMM Lab to Measure Pool State