Execution Surplus and Welfare in a Simplified Intent-Auction Game
Solver competition and endogenous participation shape private execution gains and aggregate welfare across batch durations in a simplified intent-auction game.
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A chronological index of field notes on research, engineering, markets, and protocols.
Solver competition and endogenous participation shape private execution gains and aggregate welfare across batch durations in a simplified intent-auction game.
TVL is a measure of capital. The marginal price is the current quote. Liquidity tells us how much trading it takes to move that quote.
A collateral boundary still exists onchain. The difference is who may submit the liquidation once it is reached.
When discovery stops being scarce, competition becomes an execution race—and the rule that allocates execution determines how much rent participants keep.
CoW batches trades and auctions execution to competing solvers. Its auction data shows what those competing plans look like.
Thirty externally selected Solana price shocks, one Orca pool: sometimes price and landed execution return to normal together. Sometimes they don't.
A minimal benchmark that separates onchain participation from independent information: what actually moves the price when traders are added.
Four synthetic markets priced companies before their shares could trade.
When the yen broke, what moved onchain, and in what order? Tracing risk transfer through Hyperliquid and DeFi markets.
Execution provenance reconstructed for all 6,695 landed transactions in a frozen SPYx x OKX router set, and what that evidence can actually prove.
An empirical note on how multiple Uniswap v3 pools behave like one under an impact-constrained capacity objective.
A transaction-level audit shows why a quoted slippage threshold can disappear before a Solana swap lands.
A transaction-level study traces router, provider, and execution-source claims in Solana tokenized-equity trades.
Part II of the DFlow series: what a landed Solana transaction can and cannot prove about which router executed it.
As execution becomes an embedded wholesale service, synchronized JTX quotes show that app-level fees still shape the price offered before signing.
Why the execution benchmark had to be frozen, with data, configuration, and evaluation fixed, before any result could count as evidence.
A large DEX order pays for a path, not a single price. Framing execution as sequential control over pool state, fees, and liquidity response.
How frozen AMM logs became a matched difference-in-differences pipeline in R, behind the finding of no large short-run liquidity exit after UNIfication.
After the Uniswap fee switch turned on, did liquidity providers leave? A causal look at the short-run liquidity response.
After Uniswap v4 went live, the pool stopped being the whole market. Mapping where trading and liquidity actually sit now.
Hyperliquid is more than a price story. What an outsider can reconstruct from an onchain order book that keeps moving.
When does a dynamic AMM fee actually help? Simulations of which pool-state signals let a fee price toxic flow.
When no AMM pool forms, where does the market go? Hyperliquid shows what price formation looks like without one.
Before studying MEV, a Rust AMM lab that measures pool state directly, so later execution questions start from observable pool mechanics.
Changepoint detection on Ethereum base fees under EIP-1559: useful as early-warning signals for fee-risk stress tests, not as regime labels.